

EDITORIAL

This special issue of the Operations Research and Decisions is dedicated to the Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory SING 10, an international meeting that started as a reference point for game theorists mainly from Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, but now includes scholars from all over the world that each year congregate in a European city.

In 2014, the meeting was held in Cracow (Poland) and was successfully chaired by Izabella Stach, with outstanding invited speakers, Gianfranco Gambarelli, Gerard van der Laan, Andrzej Nowak and Ariel Rubinstein, contributions of high scientific quality, and pleasant and interesting social events, a tour of the old town and visit to Wieliczka Salt Mine. This is a good moment to thank the organizing and the scientific committees.

Some of the 139 presentations, 135 in parallel sessions and 4 in plenary sessions, are collected in this issue. We hope that they offer a good, even if restricted, idea of the aims and scope of the SING meetings.

The first paper, by Cesarino Bertini, Jerzy Duda, Bartłomiej Gaweł, Andrzej Paliński, Iwona Skalna and Izabella Stach provides some interesting statistics about the Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meetings on Game Theory over the years 2005–2014, with special attention paid to the last one, held in Cracow. They take into account the number of accepted papers, their topics, the number of participants, dividing them according to country.

Imma Curiel analyzes the electoral system of Suriname, with particular attention paid to the discrepancies in the representation of various districts. Several apportionment methods have been explored and compared. It is concluded that, in general, the method of equal proportions provides good performance.

The paper by Vito Fragnelli and Gianfranco Gambarelli, based on the plenary talk by Gianfranco Gambarelli, offers a survey of some open problems in cooperative games that the authors have pointed out in some recent papers, including theoretical, modelling and practical problems.

Hannu Nurmi considers the possibility of building a theory of social choice based on individual preference tournaments, when preferences may be intransitive, incomplete and discontinuous, referring to rational behaviour. A new interpretation of Slatyer's rule has been presented.

Honorata Sosnowska applies the Banzhaf value to evaluating the power of countries in the voting system with rotation which is planned to be used in the European Central Bank in conjunction with the accession of new members to the economic and monetary union. The results have been compared with the Shapley value.

We would like to thank all the authors for their important contributions and all the reviewers for their valuable work. Special thanks have to be given to Jacek Mercik for his constant presence “in the background” and useful suggestions.

Vito Fragnelli and Izabella Stach
Guest Editors